The USA and the Russian Federation: What's next in the post-sanctions era?[1]

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Abstract: *After the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian Federation was faced with a series of international sanctions aimed to change its foreign policy towards Ukraine. Three years after the start of this major geo-political event, this research aims to present its impact on the relationship between the USA and the Russian Federation (in terms of trade and capital flows) but also to critically assess whether these sanctions proved effective. It should be mentioned that even before the Ukrainian crisis, the bilateral relation was a tensioned one, a series of other sanctions being imposed by the USA to the Russian Federation, most of them related to human rights infringement. The main goal of this paper is to assess the effects of the mutual economic sanctions imposed after the Ukrainian crisis. The used methodology is based on the most relevant theoretical approaches related to international sanctions, but also on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the bilateral economic relations before and after the Ukrainian crisis, emphasizing the impact of the change brought by the President Donald Trump election as concerning the future of the two countries relationship. The main finding of the research is that economic sanctions are costly for both countries with little or none result in restoring the former status-quo in Ukraine and achieving a change of the Russian Federation's foreign policy.*

Keywords: *Ukrainian crisis, international sanctions, Russian economy, US economy, bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, Russian banking system*

1. About the international sanctions effectiveness – the case of the Ukrainian crisis

The Ukrainian crisis has induced severe tensions between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The conflict peaked when Russian troops were committed to Crimea after a referendum about the incorporation into the Russian Federation that was held at a short notice. As a response, the USA have adopted a series of economic and political sanctions (Appendix 1) in order to put pressure on Russian economy and to obtain the change of the Russian Federation's foreign policy towards Ukraine. These sanctions were met by counter-sanctions deployed by the Russian Federation on agricultural imports (Appendix 2).

In the last years, economic sanctions are an increasingly common tool of coercion in international disputes. International sanctions are targeted action against a sovereign state to repress an act of violence or the possibility of initiating such an act. Consequently, sanctions must meet strict principles with confidence that their effect will be as expected. Firstly, given that breaches of international law the applied sanctions cannot be resolved through direct political negotiations between the parties. Secondly, sanctions are used by states and international organizations only against a state that committed unlawful acts or actions or a breach of international law. Thirdly, the implementation of sanctions cannot use armed force or use any form of force (only the United Nations Security Council may impose sanctions on the military matters, with certain exceptions). Usually, the intention of subjecting a state to sanctions is to make him to renounce of its aggressive behaviour and to comply with the norms of international law in force (Jura et al., 2015).

[1] Some aspects of the article were presented at the International Conference „Romania and Bulgaria in the context of European integration and globalization”, on 17-18 November 2016, Institute for World Economy.

There is an extensive literature review about international sanctions effectiveness in changing the foreign policy of the sanctioned state, but as many studies (Hufbauer, 1990; Hufbauer et al. 2007[2]; Jentleson, 2000; Morgan, Krustev & Bapat, 2006[3]) have underlined that although the economic effects of the sanctions are indisputable such measures are not often successful in achieving a change of the targeted country's foreign policy.

In the mainstreamed approaches related to the sanctions theory (Hufbauer, 2007) it is stated that while "economic sanctions are considered an important tool for government withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations" they remain "a controversial foreign policy tool that policymakers invoke to respond to perceived misdeeds of foreign governments".

Some studies (Poladian & Drăgoi, 2014) have pointed out that the Ukrainian crisis is a very concluding case on "how political decisions would quickly lead to negative economic effects on regional and international level between all power poles involved". The authors have showed that while economic sanctions may negatively affect the economy (shortly after the imposition of sanctions, the Russian Federation entered into recession) the political regime may remain inflexible in its choices. Considering this indisputable truth, some analyses (Kholodilin et al. 2014) has stated that the mutual imposed sanctions have only tensioned the bilateral relation, have triggered mutual economic losses, but they are unlikely to trigger a profound change in Russian foreign policy.

Some authors (Ahn & Ludema, 2016), based on detailed firm-level data, empirically argue that implemented US sanctions are quite "smart," as they have a powerful impact on the targets themselves with relatively minimal collateral damage, i.e. they have had a relatively smaller impact on Russia's economy compared to oil prices. They find that oil price volatility explains the vast majority of the decline in the Russian Federation's GDP and import demand, and only 1% of the decline of GDP can be potentially explained by sanctions. Intending to examine the impact of sanctions on targets, authors show that an average sanctioned company or associated company loses about one-third of its operating revenue, over one-half of its asset value, and about one-third of its employees relative to non-sanctioned companies. The conclusion that oil prices were the main cause of the Russian Federation's poor macroeconomic outlook since 2014 is presented as well by Tuzova and Qayub (2016). An almost similar result to Ahn & Ludema (2016) is presented by the IMF (2015) that forecasted that sanctions could reduce the Russian Federation's real output by about 1 to 1.5% of GDP, especially via weaker investment and consumption. World Bank (2015) argues without directly measuring the economic impact that sanctions against the Russian Federation and counter-sanctions may have affected investment and consumption.

In the following section of the paper will be highlighted the economic cost of sanctions, emphasizing the tensions induced in the bilateral relationship.

2. The impact of sanctions on bilateral trade and capital flows

Given "the threat posed by the actions and policies of persons who had undermined democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threatened the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine; and contributed to the misappropriation of Ukraine's assets", on 6 of March, 2014[4], Barack Obama authorized the implementation of the Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury.

Later the President of the USA issued three subsequent Executive orders (13661, 13662, 13685) that expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in the first issued order. According to these orders there were established two categories of targeted sanctions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis, blocking sanctions and sectoral sanctions (Table 1).

[2] Hufbauer et al. 2007 is one of the most known studies on economic sanctions and examines 204 sanctions episodes (the reasons behind the sanctions, the type of sanctions deployed and their duration and also an assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions).

[3] They have developed the *Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data Page* that collected data related to sanctions imposed in the international affairs.

[4] According to the Executive Order 13660.

Table 1: Categories of US targeted sanctions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List)	Sectorial Sanctions Identification List (SSI List)
Blocking sanctions against individuals and entities designated (pursuant to E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, or E.O. 13685): refer to restrictions on the travel and to asset freezes, prohibit transactions by US persons or in the United States if they involve transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing, or otherwise dealing in the property or interests in property of an entity or individual listed on SDN List.	**Sectoral sanctions** against entities operating in financial, energy, and defense sectors of the Russian economy (pursuant to E.O. 13662): prohibit financing transactions by US persons or issue debt of longer than 30 days' maturity or acquire new equity with targeted companies in the Russian financial or defense sector, as well as restrictions to debt of longer than 90 days' maturity with targeted companies in the energy sector.

Source: Author's representation based on Executive Orders (13660, 13661, 13662, 13685).

The USA has designated, according to the Executive Orders, 111 individuals and 82 entities on its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and explicitly designated 136 entities on its Sectoral Sanctions Identification List facing sectoral sanctions. By imposing sanctions on entities within the financial services and energy sectors, Treasury has increased *the cost of economic isolation* for key Russian firms that value their access to medium- and long-term US sources of financing. By designating firms in the arms or related materiel sector, Treasury has cut these firms off from the US financial system and the US economy.
As the US sanctions covered mainly trade and finance, this section will focus on how these restrictions have disrupted bilateral trade and how investors have responded to their home-states' coercive measures imposed against the Russian Federation, by adjusting their investment policies and seeking for other sources of profit. Consequently, it will be evaluated the distorting impact of the imposed set of sanctions, which connected with two other major shocks[5] that negatively affected Russian economy in the last years, have a severe direct impact on trade and investment.

After the post-cold-war period the Russian Federation has gone through economic collapse and recovery. Its GDP was worth 1.32 trillion of US dollars in 2015, after reaching an all-time high of 2.23 trillions of US dollars in 2013 and a record low of 195.91 billion of US dollars in 1999 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: GDP growth in the Russian Federation, 1996-2015



Source: Author's representation based on World Bank Database (2016)

[5] The main events were the sharp drop in international oil and commodity prices and the abrupt decline of the national currency, the rouble.

After the Ukrainian crisis, as a result of mutual sanctions, the Russian economy has dropped by 3.7%, the trade with world decreased by 19.6% and the FDI flows dropped by 70.5% in 2015. Despite the mutual sanctions, in 2015, the USA is on the 6th position as a trade partner of Russia (reaching 23.5 billion of US dollars, see Figure 2). The base of Russian exports to USA is represented by mineral fuels (62.9%), and by contrast the Russian imports from the USA are machinery and appliances.

Figure 2: Top trading partners of the Russian Federation in 2015 (billions of dollars)



Source: Author's representation based on Eurostat data (2016)

The Russian Federation trade with the USA has declined during the last four years (Figure 3), with a sharp drop especially during the last two years, as a result of deploying mutual economic sanctions.

Figure 3: US trade with the Russian Federation in 2005-2015 (billions of dollars)



Source: Author's representation based on The Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce data (2016)

A declining trend has been recorded as well regarding bilateral investment. After the peak of this cooperation, achieved in 2008 (Figure 4), the Russian Federation FDI flows with the USA have not yet seen a revival.

Figure 4: FDI flows with the USA (millions of dollars)

Source: Author's representation based on The Central Bank of the Russian Federation data (2016)

As a result of Russian ban, the US food exports have been affected, registering a significant drop after 2014 (Figure 5).

Figure 5: US exports to the Russian Federation (thousands of dollars)



	Wheat	Rice	Oil seeds	Corn	Sorghun barley and oats	Meat	Dairy products and eggs	Fruits and frozen juices	Vegetables	Nuts	Wine beer and related products	Fish and shellfish
2014	35	7810	2395	12128	48	283090	3043	20999	12483	87054	9969	44478
2015	14	2796	628	4753	7	695	1202	2952	7178	16350	3813	3
2016	0	1324	557	1705	0	0	1256	4221	2967	8885	1917	157

Source: Author's representation based on The Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce data (2017)

The Russian banking sector has faced difficult conditions since 2014: the gross domestic product has shrunk, the inflation rate has risen, and difficulties with external funding of corporations and banks have remained acute. Sectoral sanctions deployed by the USA have almost closed the access to external funding sources for Russian banks and have isolated Russian firms from medium- and long-term US sources of financing. These events have stimulated the banking sector to intensively use internal sources, while the structure of these sources has been significantly changed. Russian banks have raised their resource base mainly from central bank's loans and deposits attracted from the Federal Treasury.

Moreover, Russian banks' profitability indicators have been negatively affected (Figure 6). Banks were forced to made additional loan loss reserves in conditions of borrowers' financial position worsening. Increased interest rate risk has reduced the interest margin of credit institutions. As a result, in 2015 the profit of the banking sector significantly dropped to a level that has not been recorded since 2005 and the number of unprofitable credit institutions increased.

Figure 6: Russian banking sector's net profit, loan loss reserves and the number of unprofitable credit institutions



Source: Author's representation based on The Central Bank of the Russian Federation data (2017)

Such a low level of profitability does not allow banks to increase capital through capitalization of profits. As well a significant drop has been recorded regarding the profitability of assets and of banks' capital at the end of 2015. All these trends negatively affected the Russian banking sector attractiveness for investors in the medium term (Figure 7).

Figure 7: The share of foreign capital in the banking sector of the Russian Federation (%)



Source: Author's representation based on The Central Bank of the Russian Federation data (2017)

In this situation, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Bank of Russia implemented a set of measures aimed at ensuring the systemic stability of the banking sector, and at supporting bank lending of priority sectors of the economy. A tangible result had the implementation of the program of capitalization of banks through the Deposit Insurance Agency. Additional measures were taken to develop and strengthen the financial infrastructure.

3. The Donald Trump approach – a new reboot for the bilateral relationship?

During its campaign but also shortly after its election, the US president, Donald Trump, have repeatedly affirm its willingness to achieve a better relation with the Russian Federation. Along the way, Trump has consistently argued that the Russian Federation can be a strong ally rather than a strategic adversary. Many analysts have even speculated a possible renunciation of the imposed sanctions. But is it possible such a scenario? And moreover, can it be enforced? Besides the fact that any move for lifting the sanctions would be controversial (especially from the point of view of US main allies – the EU and Canada), it could also be difficult if not impossible to put in practice.

In case if the US president, Donald Trump, decides to lift the sanctions he has several possibilities to do it.

Firstly, he may enact or revoke certain adopted executive orders by his own decree, i.e. the cancellation of executive orders of their predecessors could be carried out by the issuance of a new directive and does not require the approval of the congress. Secondly, Donald Trump could put into action its decisions through the congress. Republicans retained a majority in both houses of the US Congress after the elections and were thus enabled to make the necessary changes to US legislation[6]. Thirdly, he can revoke Obama's legislative initiatives by appointing in government agencies and in the judiciary system key people who share his political views.

The most feasible possibility of lifting the sanctions against the Russian Federation remains the first one - cancellation of executive orders adopted by Barack Obama. However, a part of the sanctions is prescribed in the law on Ukraine's Support[7], which was adopted by the Congress and signed by Obama in December 2014. Without the consent of the Congress, Donald Trump cannot abolish the sanctions prescribed in this law.

Regarding the reliance on the US Congress to pass a decision on lifting the sanctions is less feasible, in conditions of a real concern of the Congress related to the cancellation of executive orders by Donald Trump. The US senators proposed a bill on “comprehensive” sanctions against Russian officials and foreign companies in January 2017[8]. They tried to give the force of law to the four executive orders of the US President Barack Obama on sanctions against Russia. To become law, the bill would have to pass both houses of Congress and be signed by the President. Thus Donald Trump has to face the Republican Party’s consensus that sanctions should be strengthened.

The third possibility concern the US Supreme Court. Considering that the Supreme Court is the institution that can abolish presidential executive orders, one of the current Donald Trump’s moves in this direction is the nomination of the Judge Neil Gorsuchon for one of the nine seats of the Supreme Court, which could theoretically give a chance to Trump to influence the decisions of the Court.

4. Three scenarios for the future of USA – Russian Federation relationship

Based on our analysis we believe that there are three possible scenarios for the future of USA – Russian Federation relationship: the neutral scenario (with the maintaining of the current status-quo), the reborn of strategic partnership and the intensification of present tensions (the pessimistic scenario) (Figure 8 – the scenarios explained).

[6] After the elections in the Senate, the Republicans have 52 votes out of 100, and in the House of Representatives - 241 out of 435 seats.
[7] Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014.
[8] The bill imposes sanctions in response to cyber intrusions by the Government of the Russian Federation and other aggressive activities of the Russian Federation.

Figure 8: Three scenarios for the USA – Russian Federation future relationship



Source: Author's representation

The first scenario, the neutral approach with the maintaining of current status quo, is less advantageous while the economic losses of both countries go on, and no improvement in the Ukraine situation is achieved, is a zero gain for both parties.

In our opinion, considering the change of political regime in the US, which is not such antagonistic to the Russian Federation, a soft alliance is possible and a tension release could take place, leading to **the second scenario – the reboot of strategic partnership**. However, for achieving a thaw in the bilateral relationship the situation in Ukraine should shift in a direction more conducive to compromise. Such evolution might occur by means of a growing rift between President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, resulting in the collapse of the ruling coalition, and a new Ukrainian government more conciliatory toward the Donbass. If the EU would terminate most of its sanctions in 2017, the USA could follow soon after, even if, as we have shown, it could be a difficult process needing the support of the Congress.

The third scenario, that we have named the pessimistic one, presupposes a growing division among the USA and the Russian Federation, with the conflict in Eastern Ukraine remaining unsolved and risking to become a "frozen" one. We believe that this scenario is less plausible while the USA continues to shift resources to Asia, and finds it difficult to build a coalition to balance against the Russian Federation. Presently, the new elected US President Donald Trump, is forced to choose between the Russian Federation and China, with the US military budget not allowing to work against both emerging powers simultaneously. Moreover, a situation of new Cold War will not be beneficial for neither of the two countries. While the Donbass conflict could effectively become the latest and largest "frozen conflict" in the post-Soviet space, this will not lead to renewed stability or normalization.

5. Conclusion

It is our opinion that the image of the Russian Federation as a weak and a withdrawn from the international arena's country as a consequence of imposed sanctions is not an accurate one, while it has great resources, and the political force necessary to find solutions to the current economic challenges. While it cannot be denied that national economy is shrinking and the population's poverty is increasing, the Russian Federation may not be forced to retreat from Ukraine, as long as the country owns some redoubtable policy toolkit that may undermine the international alliance's cohesion: cyber operations, economic boycotts, monopolistic position on the energy markets in Europe. However, to continue to maintain the "frozen" relations with the USA may prove to be an extremely unpractical approach for the Russian authorities due to the high risk of a liquidity crisis (so far the sanctions had a severe impact on Russian currency due to the restricted access to the international financial markets, also determining a decline in investors' confidence) since financial sanctions already affected not only state owned companies but, through a domino effect, the private sector as well. Under these circumstances the question arises: is it appropriate to continue maintaining those economic sanctions that are politically ineffective? To this question it is hard to offer a simple answer. Our analysis has proven that the economic sanctions are costly for both parties with little or none result in restoring the former status-quo in Ukraine. Taking into account the mutual economic risks in preserving the current status-quo a new reboot of the bilateral relationship may be necessary. While the President Trump seems to favor such approach, some of the US Congress members are trying to transform Obama's presidential orders into law. Such development will make very difficult for President Trump to denunciate some of these sanctions. However, despite traditional adversities, a more relaxed USA – Russian Federation relationship remains crucial for the global equilibrium in a much tensioned international environment. Moreover, if anti-Russian sanctions are extended, the Russian Federation could try to reinforce its alliance with China, even if Beijing hesitates an open alliance due to its economic relations with the USA and Europe. Ultimately, by maintaining the present status-quo none of the two countries achieve their goals on the international arena, with China emerging as a possible winner while the USA and the Russian Federation are focusing on mutual sanctions.

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Appendix 1. Timeline of US sanctions against the Russian Federation

Date	Description of sanctions
6/03/2014	Issuance of the Executive Order (E.O.) 13660 and declaration of a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by the actions and policies of certain persons who had undermined democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine.
16/03/2014	Issuance of the E.O. 13661 that blocks the property and interests in property of individuals and entities listed in the Annex to this E.O.
20/03/2014	Issuance of the E.O. 13662 to further expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660 and expanded by Executive Order 13661. It authorizes the imposition of sanctions on certain entities operating in specified sectors of the Russian Federation economy (sanctions target 16 Russian Government officials and Bank Rossiya).
28/04/2014	Commerce Department announces expansion of export restrictions on Russia. According to it the Department will deny pending applications for licenses to export or re-export any high technology item to Russia that contribute to Russia's military capabilities.
8/05/2014	OFAC issued a set of regulations to implement E.O. 13660, E.O.13661, and E.O. 13662
16/07/2014	Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on entities within the financial services and energy sectors of Russia, against arms or related materiel entities, and those undermining Ukraine's sovereignty. Actions implement E.O. 13662. • Treasury imposed sanctions that prohibit U.S. persons from providing new financing to 2 major Russian financial institutions (Gazprombank OAO and VEB) and 2 Russian energy firms (OAO Novatek and Rosneft), limiting their access to US capital markets. It has not blocked the property or interests in property of these companies, nor prohibited transactions with them. • Treasury designated and blocked the assets of 8 Russian defense firms.
29/07/2014	Announcement of additional Treasury sanctions on Russian financial institutions and on a defense technology entity • Treasury imposed sanctions that prohibit US persons from providing new financing to 3 major Russian financial institutions (Bank of Moscow, Russian Agricultural Bank, and VTB Bank OAO), limiting their access to US capital markets. • Treasury has designated and blocked the assets of a state-owned defense technology firm (United Shipbuilding Corporation).
12/09/2014	Announcement of expanded Treasury sanctions within the Russian financial services, energy and defense or related materiel sectors. The US Department of the Treasury extended targeted financial sanctions to Russia's largest bank, deepened existing sanctions on Russian financial institutions, expanded sanctions in Russia's energy sector, and increased the number of sanctioned Russian entities in the energy and defense sectors: • Treasury has imposed sanctions that prohibit transactions by US persons or within the USA involving new debt of greater than 30 days' maturity issued by Rostec, a major conglomerate that operates in the defense sector. Treasury has designated and blocked the assets of 5 Russian state-owned defense technology firms. • Treasury has prohibited US persons providing equity or certain long-term debt financing. In addition, have tightened the debt financing restrictions by reducing from 90 days to 30 days the

	maturity period for new debt issued by the 6 Russian banks (Bank of Moscow, Gazprombank OAO, Russian Agricultural Bank, Sberbank, VEB, and VTB Bank) • Treasury has imposed sanctions that prohibit the exportation of goods, services (not including financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil, to 5 Russian energy companies – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Rosneft – involved in these types of projects. • Treasury has imposed sanctions that prohibit financing or other dealings in new debt of greater than 90 days maturity issued by 2 additional Russian energy companies – Gazprom Neft and Transneft.
19/12/2014	Issuance of the E.O. 13685 for additional steps to address the Russian occupation of the Crimea region of Ukraine. E.O. 13685 prohibits the exportation or importation of any goods, services, or technology to or from the Crimea region of Ukraine, and prohibits new investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by a US person, wherever located.
4/03/2015	Extension of the national emergency declared in E.O. 13660 for a year.
11/03/2015	OFAC updated the Specially Designated Nationals List with 14 individuals and 2 entities**:** Eurasian Youth Union, Russian National Commercial Bank (RNKB OAO).
10/08/2015	OFAC updated the Specially Designated Nationals List with 11 individuals and 15 entities**, foreign subsidiaries of VEB, Rosneft and other energy companies located outside Russia.**
22/12/2015	OFAC updated the sectoral list with **foreign subsidiaries of VTB, all Sberbank entities,** non-government pension funds of Sberbank and VTB, Online payment service "Yandex-money", several Russian defense companies, included in the structure of state corporation Rosteh.
2/03/2016	Extension of sanctions for a year against the Russian Federation.
1/09/2016	Deploying sanctions on a number of 46 subsidiaries of "Gazprom", companies of the Sovraht-Sovmortrans group, as well as a number of Russian shipbuilding plants and individuals.
6/09/2016	The US Department of Commerce expanded the sanctions list with 11 new Russian companies.
20/12/2016	Expanding anti-Russian sanctions. The list was replenished by 7 individuals, 8 organizations and two tankers "Marshal Zhukov" and "Stalingrad". Restrictions have been specified with regard to Novatek, which is already under sanctions (the document lists all its 26 subsidiaries).

Source: Author's representation based on studied literature and legislation.

Appendix 2. Timeline of the Russian Federation's sanctions against the USA

Date	Description of sanctions
20/03/2014	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation imposed travel bans for 9 officials and members of the US Congress.
28/03/2014	Moscow took counter mirror measures to expanded sanctions lists of the United States officials (60 individuals).
7/08/2014	Moscow limited for a year imports of agricultural products, raw materials and food: beef, pork, fruit, poultry, cheeses and dairy products, nuts and other products. Later the list excluded goods, which are difficult to be replaced by the Russian Federation.
11/08/2014	The government of the Russian Federation restricted state acquisitions of foreign light industry goods (foreign fabrics, outerwear and overalls, leather clothes, underwear, footwear, fur products and others).

24/06/205	Extension for a year of special economic measures against the USA, introduced by the presidential decree of August 6, 2014. The response was extended from August 6, 2015 to August 5, 2016.
6/08/2015	According to The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 29, 2015, agricultural products gotten on the territory of Russia under sanctions will be destroyed directly on the border.
27/05/2016	Russia excluded from the list of food embargoes meat and vegetables used for the production of baby food.
29/06/2016	Vladimir Putin extended the food embargo imposed in response to Western sanctions from August 6, 2016 to December 31, 2017.

Source: Author’s representation based on studied literature and legislation.